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Should citizens armed with religious reasons for public policy
outcomes present those reasons in the public forum or otherwise rely
on them in making decisions? Those questions have produced a
flurry of scholarship, both within and outside of the law. Moreover, as
Kent Greenawalt's work richly demonstrates, these related questions
raise many more questions still. Do the answers to those questions
differ, for example, if the citizen is ajudge, a legislator, a columnist, a
religious leader, or a "mere" voter? Are some religious reasons accept-
able for presentation in a public forum, but not others?'
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am honored to be a part of this
celebration of the work of Kent Greenawalt. His prolific work is invariably thoughtful,
careful, and rigorous. It is a special pleasure, albeit daunting, to address the subject
of religion and democracy in this connection. As Sandy Levinson observes, Professor
Greenawalt has more than led the way: "Greenawalt is surely among the most
distinguished contributors, as both philosopher and lawyer, to the general debate
about liberalism and religion and, more specifically, about the extent to which
membership in a liberal polity presupposes the exclusion of certain kinds of
arguments from the public realm." Sanford Levinson, Abstinence and Exclusion: What
Does Liberalism Demand of the Religiously Oriented (Would Be) Judge?, in RELGION AND
CoNTEMPoRARY LIBERAISM 76, 80 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).
I would like to thank Gregory Alexander, Richard Fallon, Cynthia Farina,
Stephen Garvey, Robert Lipkin, Tracy Mitrano, Richard Miller, Emily Sherwin, Seana
Shiffirin, Gary Simson, David Williams, and Susan Williams for insightful comments on
early versions of this manuscript. I should report that some of them passionately
disagree with what I am saying. I would also like to thank some wonderful research
assistants who jump-started me on this project: Neil Eggesson, Emmy Hackett,
Benjamin King, and Carolyn Lee who helped out at the end. Finally, I would like to
thank the students in my Constitutional Law and Political Theory seminar.
I See generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS
(1995). Those who argue for restrictions (of an informal nature) typically make it
clear that they do not mean to restrict remarks made in institutions such as universi-
ties and churches (except for the endorsement of candidates in churches). They
have in mind statements addressed to the public for the purposes of political justifica-
tion. Because I argue for the most part against such restrictions, I need not worry
about what is inside and what is outside the public forum. I will use the term political
or public forum or political debate to refer to remarks addressed to the public for the
purposes of political justification.
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If one holds a constricted view of legal scholarship, the pursuit of
these questions by legal scholars might seem odd. No one is contend-
ing that religious speech be banned. Instead, in most contexts, the
claim is merely that the introduction of religious argument is uncivil,
a type of political bad manners. But the debate is quite lively even in
those contexts where no one seriously contends that an Establishment
Clause issue exists. The debate, however, has important implications
for free speech theory, for liberal theory, and for our understanding
of the role of religion in a democratic society.
Although it is fruitful to attack these questions with particular at-
tention to discrete and varying contexts, I aim for the most part to
paint with a broad brush 2 and to argue that the literature is overly
critical about the role that religious speech may properly play in dem-
2 Accordingly, I will, for the most part, ignore considerations of role. I will also,
for the most part, ignore a wide variety of positions that would restrict the religious
argument in political life, but in a less broad fashion than I posit in the text. For
example, Kent Greenawalt maintains that neither columnists nor legislators should
advance religious arguments or arguments based on comprehensive philosophical po-
sitions in the political forum, but that citizens are morally free to vote on such bases
and legislators, more than judges and executive officials, should be permitted to give
some weight to the comprehensive positions of their constituents in arriving at their
decisions. See id. at 156-62. Robert Audi takes the position that religious arguments,
at least for restricting conduct, should not be presented in the political sphere unless
there is a sufficient and adequate accompanying secular rationale and motivation. See
Robert Audi, The State, the Church, and the Citizen, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALISM, supra note * (author's note), at 38, 55-58. Lawrence Solum argues that
religious arguments should not be presented in the political sphere unless they are
accompanied by secular arguments that meet particular requirements. See Lawrence
B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 747-53
(1993). John Rawls has maintained that no comprehensive position, whether or not
religious, should be advanced to justify "'constitutional essentials' and questions of
basic justice" with certain exceptions. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 214 (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, PoLmcAL LIBERALISM]. In later writing, he has suggested that
comprehensive doctrines may be advanced regarding constitutional essentials and
questions of basic justice so long as sufficient political reasons are also provided. See
JOHN RAWLS, PoLIIcAL LIBERALISM li-ii (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS,
Paperback]; John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. Rv. 765,
783-84 (1997). On the other hand, Rawls would not permit actors in the political
public forum to attack the comprehensive doctrines of others except to the extent
that such doctrines are "incompatible with the essentials of public reason and a demo-
cratic polity." Id. at 766. Finally, Robert Lipkin argues that there is a "conceptual
antipathy" between the "American communitarian republic" and certain forms of
nondeliberative religions. Robert Justin Lipkin, Religious Justification in the American
Communitarian Republic, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 765, 785 n.59 (1996). As I read his work
(see infra notes 15 and 35), Lipkin argues that the deep structure of American consti-
tutionalism and democracy make some religious arguments uncivil in political life. I
think this argument is at odds with our history. On the other hand, I believe Lipkin
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ocratic life.3 In particular, I will criticize the arguments that it is unfair
to use religious arguments and that religious arguments are dangerous,
whether because they lead to political instability or reactionary poli-
tics.4 In painting with a broad brush, I do not mean to suggest that
religious arguments are always appropriate in democratic life. In
some contexts, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to pre-
vent the use of such arguments. I do not believe, for example, that
judges should resort to religious arguments in their opinions or that
legislatures should use religious arguments in their whereas clauses. 5
On the other hand, I maintain that participants in political debate, be
they religious leaders, columnists, or commoners, may appropriately
use religious argument. Neither democratic theory, as I argue in the
first two Parts of the Article, nor the Establishment Clause, as I argue
in the final Part of the Article, should counsel against such
participation.
impressively argues for the value of deliberative modes of discourse and admirably
contrasts deliberative approaches to discourse with "dedicated" approaches.
3 Some of the writing would extend beyond religious arguments to arguments
that entertain particular conceptions of the good life. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, So-
ciAL JUSTCE IN Tm LmERAL STATE (1980); CHARLEs LARMoRE, PATrERNS OF MORAL
CoMPLtxy (1987); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTAm.xT 154-68 (1991); JOHN
RAWIS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIc AND PRI-
VATE MORArr 113-43 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). These scholars believe that the
state should not promote particular conceptions of the good life. I assume that they
would also maintain that it would be uncivil for a citizen to advocate that the state do
so, but they are not all explicit on the point.
4 I will ignore the contention that a religious perspective is false. The bulk of
the literature does not rely on that contention in any event. But see, e.g., Brian Barry,
How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions, in LmERALISM AND THE GOOD 44-45 (R. Bruce
Douglass et al. eds., 1990); Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening The Religion Clauses, 7J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL Issuns 473 (1996) (charging most of the major religions in the United
States with irrationality). No one in the literature goes quite as far as Sigmund Freud
who, in referring to traditional views of the afterlife and prayer, remarked, "The
whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly
attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never
be able to rise above this view of life. It is still more humiliating to discover how large
a number of people living today, who cannot but see that this religion is not tenable,
nevertheless try to defend it piece by piece in a series of pitiful rearguard actions."
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVLIZATION AND rrs DiscoNTENTs 22 (1961). He thinks that religion
has some benefit, however "[Bly forcibly fixing [people] in a state of psychical infan-
tilism and by drawing them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many
people an individual neurosis." Id.
5 The same conclusion should follow (though it is a closer case) if a legislator's
comments are formally part of the legislative history. By contrast, religious arguments
by government officials or columnists (to mention a strong and specific disagreement
I have with Professor Greenawalt) are appropriately introduced into political debate.
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Although I will deal with the fairness argument at some length, I
should state at the outset that I have little patience with that aspect of
the debate. Much of the literature is focused on how people should
speak to one another in an imaginary well-ordered society-a utopian
society that we do not now have and that I believe we never will have.
6
I believe we live in an unjust society. Consequently, we should not be
entertaining excessively precious conceptions of respect, nor should
we be assuming that instability is necessarily a bad thing.7 We should
instead be fostering dissent,8 and we should be recognizing that reli-
gious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more pro-
gressive society.
I. UNFAIR?
Is it unfair to use religious arguments in political debate? One
line of argument goes like this: because pluralism is a central fact of
our democratic society, it is vital that forms of public reason be accept-
able to reasonable people of differing philosophical or religious per-
6 This criticism does not apply to Greenawalt's work. He argues that most of his
prescriptive conclusions comport with the current traditions of discourse. Although I
disagree with many of his conclusions, it would simply be wrong to suggest that he is
focusing on a utopian ideal.
7 In this respect, I am a considerable distance away from the concerns of John
Rawis. Rawls's move away from RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, to RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, was motivated by the concern that the just society
he proposed would be unstable. See RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at xv-xvii. He
seems to be concerned that the threat to stability might come from those who hold
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, for example, followers ofJohn Stuart Mill. See
id. I find this implausible. It is true that believers in other reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, for example, followers ofJohn Stuart Mill, liberal utilitarians, and the like
might disagree with the Kantian foundations of the regime, but the basic structure of
the political regime would be well within the range of the reasonable for them. Any
fights over what comprehensive doctrine to unite behind would be ideological strug-
gles leading to the same basic structure. This is not an instability to worry about.
To the extent stability might genuinely be threatened, the sources would likely be
those who hold doctrines that Rawls would regard as unreasonable, particularly those
who desire unreasonably unequal distributions of wealth.
Of course, Rawls is working in the area of ideal theory. He recognizes that the
issue of how to get to a just society is a "long-term political reform... project to be
carried out." RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at 398. But he thinks a necessary step in
that analysis is to know the ideal society that you would like to steer society towards. I
think such theorizing can be helpful, though not always necessary, to guide political
action. On the other hand, as I subsequently argue, such theorizing can also get in
the way. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 219 (1987).
8 For support of this contention, see IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 234-42
(1996); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA ch. 4
(1999).
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suasions. People have a right to be treated with equal respect and
concern. If sanctions are imposed on the basis of philosophical or
religious orientations that a person of a different orientation could
reasonably reject,9 then the basis for a liberal society dissolves, and the
sanctions are illegitimate.
The first problem with this argument is that it is one-sided. 10 The
argument privileges those who are tolerant and ready to meet others
halfway." For the toleration-minded of many different persuasions, a
requirement that one be restricted to arguments that assume no com-
prehensive view, religious or otherwise, may be perfectly compatible
with their own comprehensive views. It may be a sensible compromise
in meeting others halfway. But, to take a standard problem with the
argument, consider the religious person, call him John, who thinks
that abortion is immoral because a soul exists from the moment of
conception and who believes it therefore follows that the state must
prevent abortions lest the innocent be killed. One obvious response
to John might be to argue that his position is wrong (wrong about the
soul or wrong about the connection between the existence of the soul
vel non and the proper role of the state) and that he, therefore, ought
not present it. The argument we are considering, however, is alto-
gether more sweeping. The argument is that John should refrain
from presenting his position even if his position is entirely correct.
12
9 Some go further and argue that limits on liberty are not justified unless the
person burdened could not reasonably reject the reasons given, as opposed to the
orientation buttressing the reasons, for the limitation. This approach produces a
hefty libertarian bias. It blinks either at the ordinary unavailability of such reasons in
a pluralistic society or at the liberty denying effects of the market or both. Alterna-
tively, it necessitates a rather robust conception of reason. Others would argue that
limits on certain liberties are indefensible in the absence of a basic structure of society
that no one could reasonably reject. This is either anarchistic or necessitates building
the theory into the concept of reason.
10 Of course, in some sense, any position on the civility of religious intervention
in political life would have discriminatory effects, if followed. See Michael McConnell,
Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Neibuhrian Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42
DEPAUL L. REv. 191 (1992) (exploring different stances taken by churches on the
church-state relationship and the implications of the case law regarding those
positions).
11 See RAWLS, PoLrarrcAc LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 157.
12 SeeJoshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MicH. L. REv. 1503, 1539
(1993) ("[W]e regard it as unreasonable to impose political power on others in the
name of values that they reasonably reject-even if those values are correct."); see also
NAGEL, supra note 3, at 157-58. Although Nagel does not address the question, Co-
hen and Rawls have applied this principle to the abortion example. See infra note 13;
see also Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, SAN DIco L.
REV. 763, 771 n.26 (1993). Larry Alexander forcefully argues that liberals cannot
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So understood, this argument is hard to credit. To ask John
to accept the notion that he should be tolerant about killing or that
he should meet people halfway is to ask that he compromise his
moral values in significant ways. John might well take the posi-
tion that a state that protects some human lives, but not others (by
permitting abortions), is illegitimate. In response, some liberals try
to evade this difficulty by characterizing John's position not merely
as something with which they disagree or as something which they
think is wrong, but as "unreasonable."'13 They suggest that only rea-
sonable views are appropriately presented in the public forum.
But this move ties the fate of liberalism to an ill-defined concep-
tion of reason. To my mind, liberalism has at least as much to do
with what we value as with how we reason. The turn toward reason
seems reductive and overstated. I say this not to side with those
who would use the state to prevent abortions. In my view, the
problem with those who argue that the state should intervene to
prevent abortions, whether or not their views are religiously based,
make good on this general principle. If Alexander is correct, liberals would need to
argue that anti-abortionists are wrong, not that their range of arguments should be
restricted in the public forum. See id.
13 I think John Rawls was guilty of this. See RAWLS, PoLrICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 2, at 243 n.32 (discussing abortion). But see RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at
lv-lvii (modifying his position, but suggesting any Catholic who would revolt, as op-
posed to merely protesting, against a failure to criminalize abortion would be unrea-
sonable). In defending Rawls's initial position, Joshua Cohen writes,
Given the complexities of the question of the status of the fetus, the consci-
entious rejection by many citizens of the claim that due respect for human
life requires that we treat the fetus as a human person in the first trimester,
the weight of the equality of women as a political value, and the importance
ofjustification to others when such weighty values are at stake, how could it
be reasonable to urge the state to endorse and to enforce the view that due
respect for human life bars first-trimester abortions? Someone who rejects
first-trimester abortions may reply that when it comes to preventing the mur-
der of innocent babies, right is more important than being reasonable. But
that reply concedes the point about reasonableness, which is the only issue I
am now addressing.
Cohen, supra note 12, at 1539. Of course, that reply does concede the reasonableness
point. But a Catholic might deny the complexities of the status of the fetus and argue
that the other factors, though admittedly weighty, are not weighty enough to justify
the denial of respect for human life. This may be wrong, but it is a large step to say it
is unreasonable except on a definition of reasonableness that requires accommodation
in controversial situations (the going halfway theory). That definition of reasonable-
ness may be necessary to have a working theory of political liberalism, but it trades on
an underinclusive conception of reason.
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is that they are wrong on the merits, not that they commit the
offence of incivility in presenting their views in the public forum.'
4
Second, the assumption that arguing from premises that non-reli-
gious persons could not accept denies them equal respect and con-
cern is questionable. 15 You and I might have different philosophi-
cal and religious views, and I may seek to capture the state to enact
legislation based on my views, but all that shows is that I disagree
with you. It does not show that I lack respect for you as a person.16
14 Abortion is perhaps the most difficult case for this variety of liberalism, but the
objection applies to more garden variety conservative positions as well. To take an-
other similar example, suppose John believes for religious reasons that the consump-
tion of obscene material is immoral and that its public distribution debases our public
morality. John may also feel that to compromise these views is itself immoral. To
characterizeJohn's view as "unreasonable" for its unwillingness to compromise is alto-
gether too fast. This is not to endorse either of the hypothesized views; it is rather to
say that toleration may look "reasonable" from the perspective of the liberal state and
"unreasonable" from the perspective of many millions of people whose views, albeit
controversial, should not automatically be deemed beyond the pale.
"That there are views that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a
permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing
them-like war and disease-so that they do not overturn political justice." RAwLs,
PoLrrCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 64 n.19. Despite the harshness of this lan-
guage, Rawls cannot be fairly read to recommend the combating of conservative un-
dermining of democratic freedoms by restricting their free speech or by any other
undemocratic means.
15 The argument is sometimes made that the United States has a firm cultural
commitment to the principle that people are owed equal concern and respect or are
free and equal. Rawls in particular must make an argument like this because his
political liberalism does not permit him to argue from any comprehensive doctrine.
But the truth is that persons are regarded as free and equal in this culture except to
the extent that they are not because of racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, or what
have you. See Robert Justin Lipkin, In Defense of Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of
Reasonableness, Public Reason, and Tolerance in Multicultural Constitutionalism, 45 DEPAuL
L. Rv. 263, 291 n.117 (1996); Steven Shiffrin, Liberal Theory and the Need for Politics, 89
MICH. L Ray. 1281, 1286-87 (1991). Never mind that the cultural basis (for better or
for worse) for regarding people as free and equal is quite arguably religious. For the
contention that the defense of human rights depends upon a religious perspective,
see MicHAEL.J. PERRY, LOv AND POWER 36-41(1991).
See Thomas Nagel's argument, supra note 3, for a limited public sphere of argu-
ment and that the legitimacy of coercion depends upon an allegiance to Kantian
political principles. His argument might appeal to those who accept those principles,
but conservatives, not to mention many liberals, do not. His description of many who
disagree with him as fanatics appears substantially overinclusive. See NAGEL, supra
note 3, at 168.
16 For commentary on the contention that respect demands that the state may
impose sanctions based on differing conceptions of what the right is, but not based on
differing conceptions of what is the good life, see Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radical-
ism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1983). Of course, the state may not
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Indeed, the failure to present my real views may itself show you lack of
respect.
17
To be sure, you may think that the legislation is immoral, but so
long as my views do not result in the violation of rights,18 it is arguably
intolerant of you to suggest that they do not belong in the political
thicket. Of course, it can be claimed that one has a right to live in a
society that makes decisions without relying on comprehensive views
one opposes. Indeed, this claim underwrites the conclusion that a so-
ciety making such decisions is illegitimate. As I have suggested, how-
ever, the strategy is too easily turned on its head: for many, a society
that is not responsive to their comprehensive views is illegitimate.
More narrowly, many might contend that a fair society is one that al-
lows differing comprehensive views to compete in democratic poli-
tics. 19 In addition, the illegitimacy claim is not easily cabined: if a
society is illegitimate because it relies on comprehensive views I reject,
why is it not illegitimate when it relies on non-comprehensive views I
deeply resent?
Reliance on religious arguments is also claimed to be unfair be-
cause they are regarded as inaccessible to a broad range of the public.
This argument privileges some religions over others, relies on an ec-
centric definition of accessibility, and makes dubious assumptions
about the role of speech in a democratic society.
The accessibility argument privileges some religions over others
because many religions reach conclusions relevant to the political
realm without resort to the Bible (or other theological sources) and
by processes of reasoning that are nontheological in character.20 The
impose sanctions in the name of religion, but as is discussed in text accompanying
notes 44-64, that does not rule out much religiously motivated legislation.
17 See MICI-AELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS 59, 64-65 (1997); Michael Sandel,
Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1794 (1994) (book review). The same
problem plagued earlier attempts to suggest that fairness demands that citizens not
take their conception of the good into account in arguing for the basic structure of
the society. See RAWiS, supra note 3. The idea was that fairness was justice. This
approach, however, presupposed that it was necessary to be fair to everyone's concep-
tion of the good, which was the very point in dispute. The question, however, could
not reasonably be begged or avoided by being smuggled into the original position or
saved for later imaginary conversations with Bruce Ackerman. See Kai Nielsen, The
Choice Between Perfectionism and Rawlsian Contractarianism, 6 INTERPRETATION 132
(1977); Shiffrin, supra note 16, at 1169. For Ackerman's argument, see ACKERMAN,
supra note 3, at 255-61.
18 In Part III, infra, I discuss and reject the contention that religiously motivated
legislation should be considered a violation of the Establishment Clause.
19 See generally PERRY, supra note 15.
20 For example, much writing by Thomas Aquinas relies on secular reason.
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accessibility argument would not foreclose reliance on such argu-
ments, but would foreclose arguments drawn from biblical interpreta-
tions. The argument supposes that "reason" is what secularists engage
in and that religious followers abandon reason except for those reli-
gious believers who reason in the orthodox mode.
The "accessibility" approach also relies on an unusual conception
of the term accessible. Suppose I maintain that God or an angel has
appeared to me in a vision. This is inaccessible in the sense that you
cannot experience the vision, but the claim that the vision occurred is
certainly intelligible. Suppose my faith is that I believe in God, Jesus
Christ as the son of God, and the Bible as the revealed word of God.
Suppose I argue the Bible teaches that homosexuality is sinful or that
the material inequality in this society and between this society and
many other countries is condemned by God. In what sense would
these arguments be inaccessible? Surely, a nonbeliever can under-
stand the argument from the Bible and might be in a position to at-
tempt to refute it. Participation in argument about how best to
interpret the Bible need not require a belief in divine inspiration for
that work or for its wisdom. A nonbeliever by definition would not
share the theological assumptions, but the nonbeliever would not
share the assumptions of many arguments made in public political
life. Perhaps the point is that the theological assumptions are unavail-
able to the nonbeliever because he has not received the gift of faith or
grace. But this is the way some believers might think of the situation;
a nonbeliever is unlikely to believe in the "gift of grace." 21 Moreover,
on this line of thought, those believers who think they come to the
21 Abner Greene argues that reliance on inaccessible arguments "splits the citi-
zenry into those who (by the believers' own terms) have current access to the truth
and those who do not." Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special?, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 535,
539. It is not clear why the believer's perspective is relevant. The nonbelievers do not
believe that the believers really have access to a nonhuman source. If they did, they
would be believers. Thus, the nonbelievers think the believers are wrong, not that
they have a specially privileged position. Greene also inveighs against the possibility
that people might be forced to "accept [religious] revelations uncritically," (which, of
course, would violate the Free Exercise Clause), and that laws based expressly on the-
istic authority would deny the nonbeliever "any real ability to affirm the source of
value under which she is being told to live." Id. at 541. For reasons I will explain
later, I too would be concerned about laws expressly based on theistic authority, but
persons might still make arguments for laws in the political sphere that are based on
theistic authority without the laws themselves being expressly based on theistic author-
ity. In any event, even if a law were expressly based on theistic authority, I do not
believe its flaw would lie in the lack of ability of the nonbeliever to affirm the source
of authority under which she is told to live unless the law itself required her to affirm
the source of authority upon which it was based. Finally, I do not believe that the
justification for a strong Free Exercise Clause depends upon banishing religious argu-
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theological assumptions through "reason" rather than a special addi-
tional gift would be able to make biblical arguments in the public
political realm, while those who think they come to the theological
assumptions by faith accompanied by grace would not. That would be
a singularly odd basis to determine who can make what arguments in
the political realm.
Even if religious arguments were inaccessible to many millions of
citizens, the notion that they should be excluded from political dis-
course makes dubious assumptions about the role of speech in a dem-
ocratic society. The most basic assumption seems to be that speech
must be potentially persuasive to all. Religious speech is said to fail on
this assumption because nonbelievers cannot agree with the starting
points. In other words, religion is said to be a conversation-stopper.
Let us put aside the possibility of conversion, though it is not clear
why we should (religious conversions occur every year in large num-
bers). Even in the absence of conversion, exposure to a religious per-
spective may spark insights in us that we would not otherwise have
entertained. This is always a possibility when we are faced with differ-
ent perspectives. 22 But even if persuasion were not a possibility, the
assumption that the possibility of persuasion is a necessary condition
for fruitful communication needs justification. Many individuals
would want to speak even if they knew they would not be persuasive
and even if they knew they would not be understood. Their purpose
might be self-expression or expressing what they believe to be God's
will regardless of the consequences. They might console themselves
with the view that they at least tried or that they got their views "on the
record."
Suppose, however, that it is uncivil to present political views that
are not intended to persuade. The assumption that public political
arguments need to be accessible to everyone cannot be maintained.
Suppose I do not speak English; must all start speaking in my lan-
guage? Suppose my language is Spanish. Should Spanish speaking be
excluded from political discourse? Should writings about physics, eco-
nomics, and chemistry be excluded from political discourse on the
ground that they are not "accessible" to the majority of the popula-
ments from the public square. But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Denoc-
racy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 222 (1992).
22 For a forceful presentation of this contention, compare Jeremy Waldron, Reli-
gious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 834-42 (1993) (ar-
guing in support of this contention), with David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the
Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 890-96
(1993) (arguing for the benefits of religious dialogue in public culture).
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tion?23 Clearly much political discourse is inaccessible to many mil-
lions of citizens. Regrettable as it may be that we are not multilingual
and broadly knowledgeable, much inaccessible speech richly deserves
to be a part of the democratic process.
In the end, the accessibility argument trades on a false picture of
the dynamics of democratic deliberation. It imagines democracy as a
national debating society in which all citizens "reason together" using
a common framework of argument in an atmosphere of total equality.
Much of the picture is attractive; certainly we should strive to reduce
the enormous inequities of the present system. But even apart from
the equality dimension, the picture is wholly false to the dynamics of
democratic politics. We live in a pluralistic society. Much public de-
bate is appropriately targeted for an audience smaller than the whole.
To declare that debate "uncivil" for its failure to comply with a fic-
tional model substitutes academic dreaming for democratic politics.
It is one thing to say we would have a better society if the model of a
national debating society were a reality, but it is hard to say that citi-
zens engage in uncivil behavior when they participate in patterns of
debate that have been with us throughout the history of the republic
and are deeply embedded in our customs, habits, and traditions.
Moreover, customs, habits, and traditions are not always wrong. A
model requiring communication to all rather than some might give us
a slightly improved sense of "togetherness," but it would drastically
lower the quality of our public discourse.
So understood, it is hard to understand why the picture of 200
million people reasoning together in a well-ordered society24 should
23 Sometimes the suggestion is made that arguments based on physics are, at least
in principle, accessible to all. It is not a meaningful use of the word principleso far as I
am concerned. I speak only for myself about the sciences, but I believe that many
arguments from physics are beyond me and would be no matter how hard I worked at
it. With the exception of those religions that would hold us not to be among the
elect, I would argue that we may disagree with particular or all religions, but we are in
principle capable of being persuaded.
24 As Rawls perceives it, a well-ordered society, among other things, is one in
which "everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same princi-
ples ofjustice .... " RAWLS, PourcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 35. This, he recog-
nizes, is a highly idealized concept. See ic; see also RAwLs, Paperback, supra note 2, at
384 n.16. On the other hand, Rawls's requirements for an "enduring and secure
democratic regime... must be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial
majority of its politically active citizens." RAWLS, PoImcxrAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2,
at 38. Rawls recognizes our present society (however much it might be willingly and
freely backed by citizens-a matter about which Rawls is silent) departs from the re-
quirements ofjustice and the needs of a basic structure as a system of social coopera-
tion. See RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at 407.
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have any grip on our understanding of what is civil in this society.25
We do not live in a well-ordered society, and we never will. Instead of
formulating reform strategies with an eye toward a society in which
every citizen yearns for justice, we should look upon the society we do
have: one divided between the strong and the weak.26 Indeed, it is
strongly arguable that the present government has no claim to legiti-
macy.2 7 It features an unrepresentative government 28 and widespread
discrimination, a corrupt electoral system, an unjust criminal 'justice"
system, and it tolerates widespread denials of adequate food, clothing,
health care, jobs, and education. If religious appeals could help in
bringing about social change that would mitigate the effects of these
injustices, it would be ironic to argue that such claims should be fore-
closed in pursuit of a "legitimate" government that at best can only be
the product of utopian imagination. 29 Apart from the persistently un-
25 I do not mean to demean ideal theory as an academic pursuit; nor do I mean
to suggest that it is without practical uses. To some extent, a notion of injustice re-
quires a notion of what a just society might look like (though as a practical matter,
that notion might be well short of a blueprint to be satisfactory). I do mean to suggest
that the issues of ideal theory do not necessarily track today's political issues. Of
course, the general question (beyond the ones discussed in this essay) of how we
speak to one another in this society with its mix ofjust and unjust elements is a live
issue. See, e.g., Amy GUTMANN & DENNIs THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996). Gutmann and Thompson rightly recognize (though in my view they could
and should have gone further) that: "Even extreme nondeliberative methods may be
justified as necessary steps to deliberation .... [W]hen reasonable perspectives are
neglected, there is a strong argument from the premises of deliberative democracy
itself to use any legal means necessary to get those views taken seriously." Id. at 136.
In my view, however, they do not adequately focus on the extent of injustice in society,
although it is understandable given the character of their project. If they had focused
more on the extent of injustice, they might have placed more emphasis on the impor-
tance in civic education of promoting a citizenry prepared to dissent against injustice.
See generally SHIFFRIN, supra note 8, at ch. 4 (1999). On the perils associated with ideal
theory in the race area, see Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in K.
ANTHONY APPIAN & Amy GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE PoLrIcAL MOAurrA OF
RACE 106, 109 (1996).
26 SeeJudith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE
27 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) ("For... liberalism the basic units of political life
are not discursive and reflecting persons, nor friends and enemies, nor patriotic sol-
dier-citizens, nor energetic litigants, but the weak and the powerful."). Regrettably,
the weak in some important dimensions, given the power of money in American gov-
ernments, include the majority of the American people.
27 An unjust society may induce compliance with its regime for prudential rea-
sons, but not because it deserves to be respected.
28 I am thinking primarily of the role of money in politics and the failure to
provide proportional representation.
29 To his credit, John Rawls recognizes this. Indeed, he maintains in a much
undiscussed footnote that "prior historical conditions may require that comprehen-
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just character of the American government,30 I say this because it has
never been the case that religious appeals31 or arguments from non-
religious comprehensive views3 2 have been absent from the public
political forum,33 and there is no reason to believe they ever will be. If
a legitimate government depends on the absence of comprehensive
views in the public forum, we will never have a legitimate government.
Perhaps it might be argued that steps toward utopia are improve-
ments, and that we should strive to minimize the presence of compre-
hensive or nonreligious views in the public forum. 34 Members of
liberal religions, however, would be the only religious believers who
would likely be convinced that a principle of excluding religious argu-
ments from the public political sphere made sense. 35 Any steps to-
sive reasons be invoked to strengthen just political] values." RAWLS, PoucAL LIBER-
AuSM, supra note 2, at 251 n.41.
30 That many governments are worse does not legitimize this one.
31 I discuss the role of religious arguments infra Part III.
32 Arguments from the comprehensive view of utilitarianism are sometimes seen
as a regular staple of political life. Although it is commonly argued that utilitarianism
is wrong, it is less commonly argued that such argumentation does not appropriately
belong in political debate, and when it is, the ferocity seems less than with similar
claims about religious argument. See Philip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their
Exclusions of the Religious, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, supra note *
(author's note), at 138, 144. On the other hand, it might be argued that most argu-
ments from consequences are not clearly advanced from a general comprehensive
position, and could, therefore, comfortably fit within the doctrine of public reason.
Nonetheless, the hostility directed against the appropriateness of utilitarianism in
political debate (as opposed to its political sagacity) seems less fervid than that di-
rected against religion.
33 John Rawls, for example, states that "[t]he idea of public reason with its duty of
civility has not yet been expressed in the public culture and remains unknown."
RAwLs, PoLrIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 251 n.41.
34 Although John Rawls's theory is primarily designed for a well-ordered society,
he would carry the principle of public reason to a society riddled with injustice. See
RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at lii (applying the principle of public reason requir-
ing secular reasons to accompany religious reasons to the abolitionists and to Martin
Luther King). In earlier work, he applied the principle to an unjust society in a modi-
fied way. See Rawls, supra note 2, at 765 (noting that abolitionists and Martin Luther
King did not go against the ideal of public reason "provided they thought, or on
reflection would have thought (as they certainly could have thought), that the com-
prehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient strength to the
political conception to be subsequently realized").
35 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 771 n.26; Quinn, supra note 32, at 159. Bawls
is confusing to me on this point. He mentions that his theory of political liberalism
does not engage those who reject his conception of constitutional democracy. See
Bawls, supra note 2, at 767. Among other things, to Rawls this includes a conception
of reciprocity that conservatives reject and a conception of the individual's moral
power to form and maintain a conception of the good without governmental direc-
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ward utopia would involve the self-imposed silencing of liberal
religious viewpoints, but not others. This might be an improvement
for those who are not liberal. But it is hard to see why liberals would
regard it as an improvement over the present system.
Thus, the appeal of political liberalism with its confined concep-
tion of public reason drastically diminishes so long as conservatives
exist in the society.36 If conservatives will not respect the limits of pub-
lic reason (and they will not), it will be hard to persuade liberals that
they should do so. Perhaps some religious liberals will squelch their
own self expression, but any gains in fairness and legitimacy seem to
be outweighed by obvious unfairness of a different sort.
II. DANGEROUS?
If arguments based on religion are not unfair, perhaps they are
dangerous. This argument comes in two forms: first, religious argu-
ments in the public forum3 7 are divisive and lead to instability; second
(less commonly given in the literature, but widely uttered in the acad-
emy), religion is a reactionary force.
A. Destabilizing?
Religion, of course, can be a divisive force. So it is in Northern
Ireland, the Middle East, and many other spots on the globe. The
question whether it is divisive now or has been divisive in the United
States is a separate matter.38 In turn, that question hinges in part on
tion and control that is also opposed by conservatives. So conceived, Rawls's political
liberalism is a political theory addressed to liberals holding different, comprehensive
doctrines. But Rawls also writes that his theory is designed to cover reasonable non-
liberal and religious doctrines. See RAWLS, Paperback, supra note 2, at xl-xli. My con-
clusion, which could well be wrong, is that Rawls's case for coverage of these doctrines
works to the extent that those doctrines are not conservative. For a provocative per-
spective on the difficulties of building a case for the liberal toleration of nonliberal
cultures beyond a modus vivendi, see Robert Justin Lipkin, Can Liberalism Justify Mul-
ticulturalism, 45 BurnALo L. REv. 1 (1997); Lipkin, supra note 15, at 291 n.117.
36 This argument applies to a strict form of public reason, such as in Rawls's early
work or in Greenawalt's work. Rawls's current willingness to permit liberals to criti-
cize "unreasonable" comprehensive views and to introduce their own subject to limita-
tions compliance of which seems fairly easy trades an ability to handle objections like
these for a somewhat emaciated doctrine of public reason. See supra note 2.
37 It bears emphasis that the concern is about religious arguments in the public
forum. Those who think it is uncivil to present religious arguments in political life do
not think it is uncivil for religious arguments to be presented outside the political
sphere.
38 Whether religion is or is not divisive in particular societies is obviously a contin-
gent matter. That understood, many scholars believe that concerns that religious ar-
gument will cause civil strife in the United States are misplaced. See, e.g., PERRY, supra
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what counts as divisive, or alternatively, when does healthy controversy
become unhealthy division? If one believes our society is well-or-
dered, perhaps concerns about stability deserve a prominent place.
But if, as I have suggested, our society is permeated with injustice,
perhaps what we need is less stability in order to move us toward jus-
tice. Our starting point should be the oft-quoted statement in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan:3 9 We have a "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open." 40 It would be peculiar to suppose that
we want uninhibited, robust, wide-open debate except when religious
principles are involved. Despite these constitutional givens, many
scholars are rather squeamish about the role of religious debate in
political life.
Ordinarily there would be a solid psychological basis for concern.
Religion is of vital concern in the lives of people. It represents their
best interpretation of the meaning of life. Particularly for those who
believe in the doctrine of hel, an enormous amount depends upon
their being right in their views. The prominence of other religious
views is threatening to those who have a strong psychological stake in
being right. The instinct to censor, to stamp out, and to persecute
those who differ can be quite strong.41 Nonetheless, we in the United
States need not be terribly concerned about the potentially destabi-
lizing character of religious argument.
First, in order to capitalize on the instinct to censor or to perse-
cute, one would have to change the structure of the Constitution in
fundarmental ways. One would have to imagine the eradication of the
Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause, not to mention the
Establishment Clause. Given the pluralism of religious groups in the
United States and the interest in self-protection, it is hard to take seri-
ously any scenario in which those constitutional protections would be
removed. In the absence of their removal, the structural barriers to
censoring or persecuting other religious believers are quite formida-
ble. Second, many American religions have long adhered to the view
that other religions should be tolerated. Indeed, ecumenical move-
note 17, at 53; Quinn, supra note 32, at 138, 144; Paul J. Weithman, Introduction:
Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPoRARY LIBER-
ALISM, supra note * (author's note), at 5; cf Maimon Schwarzchild, Religion and Public
Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes Like Rum and Coca-Cola, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 911 (noting that it is odd to consider religion as a prime
threat to tolerance). But see Sullivan, supra note 21, at 198, 222.
39 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40 Id. at 270.
41 See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993).
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ments designed to build bridges between and among churches are
sufficiently strong that one might characterize the psychological argu-
ment as missing the mark for the overwhelming majority of American
religions. In any event, the concern about stability seems substantially
overdrawn.
Lurking behind the stability argument, as well as arguments
about legitimacy and accessibility, I suspect, is an assumption that sub-
stantially more agreement or possibility of agreement is necessary to
ground a stable society than I would argue is either necessary, feasible,
or desirable. Conflict is an inevitable and permanent part of a demo-
cratic society. To hope for widespread agreement even about funda-
mental aspects of the Constitution is to hope for a different citizenry
in the United States. If we are to embrace and celebrate our plural-
ism, we must be prepared to expect difference and disagreement. Dis-
agreement, even about the Constitution, however, should not lead us
to fear for the Nation's stability. I disagree with many aspects of our
Constitution, but I am not about to storm the barricades. Acceptance
of the Constitution does not require agreement; it only requires a be-
lief that acceptance of it is preferable to violent revolution. A modus
vivendi is required-nothing more.4 2 At least, that has been our his-
tory. We do not, and historically have not, lived in the land of polit-
ical liberalism. Religious viewpoints have freely been introduced into
political life throughout our history. Largely because of our diversity
and because of the consequent inability of single groups to take
power, we have persisted in stable ways with a modus vivendi. The the-
ory that a modus vivendi will not be stable is countered by the.reality of
American history.43 If anything, the country has been too stable. Cor-
porate power in American governments drew immense opposition in
the early twentieth century and draws far less now. We need more
stirring of the waters, less quiescence, and, if necessary, more
instability.
B. Reactionary?
If not dangerously destabilizing, are religious arguments, on bal-
ance, reactionary? This concern is rarely expressed in the literature,
but it is often the first thing mentioned in conversation. Many liberal
42 For a well-developed argument along these lines, see Robert Merrihew Adams,
Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Society, in PROsPECTs FOR A COMMON MoRALrY 93,
102-07 (Gene Outka &John P. Reeder, Jr. eds., 1993). For examples of stable socie-
ties based on a modus vivendi, see MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION (1997).
43 The Civil War is not a counterexample that helps political liberalism. If the
South had had no slavery, it would not have seceded, and we would not have had a
civil war. Opposition to slavery does not require a commitment to political liberalism.
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or radical intellectuals are simply frightened by religious arguments. 44
I want to address this argument on its own terms. That is, I am willing
to suppose that the political tilt of religious argument could count
against it and that right wing arguments are bad for the polity. Both
of these assumptions are controversial, but I propose to share them
without developing arguments in their support.
The first assumption deserves some discussion, however. Why
would anyone be reluctant to argue that the presence of religious ar-
guments in political debates could have deleterious ideological conse-
quences? As I have already suggested, the proponents of confining
religious arguments in the public political square are predominantly
liberals. Some of them are so Kantian-at-heart that they shrink from
consequentialist arguments of any stripe that depend upon a specific
social context. They would prefer to argue from principle rather than
wading into the shifting and muddy waters of probable effects.
Although they would not purport to be indifferent to the political
consequences they hope would arise from the political and social insti-
tutions they support, they also tend to support one or another version
of content neutrality regarding the regulation of political speech. In
arguing that religious speech does not belong in the public political
square, perhaps a spillover effect from the rhetoric of regulation
serves to block ideological arguments. Beyond the Kantian liberals,
some pragmatic liberals argue that religion in the public political
sphere has the deleterious consequence of threatening stability, but
the thrust of this argument is that religion arouses strong feelings, not
that its thrust is excessively conservative. The argumentative stand-
point is that of the centrist seeking to find a ground from which we
can all reasonably argue.
Nonetheless, many of the liberals who distance themselves from
ideological argument, in my view, are hostile to religion to begin with
and are frightened of the religious right. Without claiming that any
hypocrisy is at work, I suspect that if progressives were dominant in
religious circles, some of the liberals in this area would be writing
about something else.
44 Compare Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech that is Both Religious and Political, 29
U.G. DAvis L. REv. 793, 800 (1996) ("The right to make religious arguments does not
depend on what conclusions those arguments would support, but assumptions about
the tendency of religious arguments seem to underlie much of the debate. The secu-
larists seem to be too driven by particular issues and too prone to associate religious
arguments with a small range of political positions they reject."), with S=rHEN
CARrER, THE CuIruRE OF DISBEU-- 48, 99, 265-74 (1993) (asserting that the problem
with the religious right is its politics, not that it brings religion into the public square).
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That said, let us directly confront the argument that religion in
political debate has reactionary consequences. Notice first that it
would generally be hard to argue that religious arguments as ad-
vanced in public political dialogue have much significant impact.
Rather, the worry is that the political spin of religious arguments
made in churches, and to a lesser extent in the wider culture, have a
negative political impact. The concern seems to be that religious con-
servatives and their political organizations have negative impacts,
rather than the religious arguments they might make. So understood,
the primary concern is about the politics of religion; 45 the secondary
concern is about the impact of religious argument in political life.
4 6
What is the political tilt of religion in public life? Surely no one
would contend that it is straightforwardly conservative, and I do not
contend that it has been straightforwardly progressive. Religion has in
many circumstances been a double-edged political sword. Nonethe-
less, I would begin with the historical proposition that progressives
have been far more present in political life than religious conserva-
tives.47 Although churches 48 were on both sides of the slavery issue,49
the antislavery forces predominated. Some scholars believe that the
direct action tactics of the abolitionists influenced progressive move-
ments throughout our history and encouraged those movements to be
involved in politics while the Christian right was slumbering in the
45 Apart from the political tilt of religion, most liberals would welcome the culti-
vation of moral behavior and civic virtue that religion and religious associations tend
to promote.
46 Nonetheless, understandably, the literature focuses on the latter rather than
the former. To suggest that nonliberal religions lack civility just because they are not
liberal is not a concern that specially attaches to religion.
47 Until the 1970s, the main religious lobbies in Washington were liberal. See
MICHAEL CORBET- &JULIA MICHAEL CORBETT, POLIrICS AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED
STATES 97 (1999).
48 When I use the term "church," I mean to include members as well, unless
otherwise specified. Greenawalt believes it civil for churches to participate in political
life giving religious reasons in ways that might be uncivil for believers in some roles,
for example, as columnists and vice versa. See GREENAWALT, supra note 1, at 174-75
(stating that it is permissible for churches to support moral judgments for religious
reasons despite straightforward political implications, but observing that churches
should approach making complex policy judgments with caution and should not rec-
ommend candidates).
49 On the religious grounding of the abolitionists, see LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN,
GREGARIOUS SAINTs: SELF AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM 1830-70 (1982);
Elizabeth B. Clark, "The Sacred Rights of the Weak": Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of
Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 463 (1995).
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private sphere.50 Churches also predominated against racial discrimi-
nation in the years leading up to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Of
course, churches have hardly led the way in the struggle for women's
rights. Indeed, many of them are on the defensive because of their
continued failure to recognize the equality of women (others revel in
their misogyny).51 But it should not be forgotten that the struggle for
women's rights in this country was initiated by religious women who
argued at the Seneca Falls conference that the equality of women "was
intended to be so by the Creator."
52
Indeed, the Seneca Falls conference was an extension of the tem-
perance movement which was in important ways a battle for women's
rights. For example, in the 1830s, according to one study, per capita
alcohol consumption was ten gallons per year.53 Since the alcoholic
consumption was led by males, it takes little imagination to see the
threat to women, not to mention children, posed by the "raw mascu-
linity of frontier America."54 Thus, Frances Willard, a major Protes-
tant leader in the temperance movement, tied the campaign to a
battle for women's suffrage, not to mention child labor laws and other
economic reforms.
55
Beyond women's rights, religious beliefs have played a strong role
in the environmental movement,56 but churches have also been on
50 See CHARLES DUNN, AMERICAN PoLrcAL THEoLoGY: HISTOICAL PERSPECTIVE
AND THEORETICAL ANALvSis 31-34 (1984). Conservative religious groups were in-
volved in the crusade against alcohol that led to prohibition (though progressive
groups dominated), but after the repeal of prohibition religious conservatives re-
treated from politics. See ROBERT BooTH FowLER & ALLEN D. HERTZKE, RELIGION AND
POLrICS IN AMERICA 23 (1995). The belief in an afterlife and the yearning for salva-
tion unquestionably has dulled participation in politics by many churches. At the
same time, church organizations have been a major training ground for political ac-
tion. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALrr. CIVIC VoLuNTARisM IN AMERICAN
PoLITrcs (1995). Indeed, churches play a significant role in providing civic skills to
those who otherwise would lack the resources. It is a vital counterbalance to a system
that otherwise tends to produce political participation by the advantaged. See id. at
18, 519.
51 For an international perspective on the role of religion in violating the rights
of women, see Martha Nussbaum, Religion and Women's Human Rights, in RELIGION
AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERAuSM, supra note * (author's note), at 93. For a rich study
of feminist protest with the Catholic Church, see MARY FAINsOD KATZENSTEIN, FArrH-
FurL AND FEARLESS: MOVING FEMINIST PROTEST INSIDE THE CHURCH AND MILITARY
105-76 (1998).
52 Gerda Lerner, The Meaning of Seneca Falls. 1848-1898, DISSENT, Fall 1998, at 35.
53 See FowLER & HER E, supra note 50, at 22.
54 Id. at 21.
55 See id. at 20-21; Co"Earr & CORBETr, supra note 47, at 100.
56 See Levinson, suPra note * (author's note), at 82 (citing Al Gore's linking of his
environmental views to God and Christ); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject
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both sides of what I would call the materialism issue. Corporations
may laud the efficiency of capitalism, but many churches have been
prepared to criticize its excesses. Indeed, the progressive reform
movement, with its support of economic reforms, had strong religious
backing from the beginning. For example, the 1912 Progressive Party
convention, which called for many democratic (direct primaries, wo-
men's suffrage, the initiative) and economic (antitrust, prohibition of
child labor, occupational health and safety) reforms, used Onward
Christian Soldiers as its theme song.57 But, it must be conceded that
religion also played a strong role in the rise of the greedier aspects of
capitalism, 58 and the individualistic character of most American
churches may have contributed to the United States' woefully weak
record on welfare in comparison with other industrialized countries.
5 9
Although many churches have argued that government has a respon-
sibility to assist the poor both here and abroad, many churches have
taken active steps to help the poor on their own or with other
denominations.
If the United States has been woefully weak in supporting the
poor, it has been comparatively strong in affording educational op-
portunities for all in a system of public education. And it should not
be forgotten that public education owes its existence to religiously mo-
tivated movements. Beyond public education, many of the nation's
most eminent institutions of higher learning were founded by
churches.
60
I do not know how to measure the relative quantity of conserva-
tive religious argument in the political sphere and that of progressive
religious argument. 61 Nor do I know how frequently political self-in-
What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons, in RELI-
GION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, surpa note * (author's note), at 162, 180 (refer-
ring to views of the Christian Environment Council).
57 See Levinson, supra note * (author's note), at 98.
58 For commentary on its relative importance, see R.H. TAwNEY, RELIGION AND
THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1998); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT
OF CAPITALISM (1938). See also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, DOES CIVILIzATION NEED RELIGION
67, 95-97, 103 (1927).
59 For a fascinating argument in support of this contention, see SEYMOUR MARTIN
LiPsET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALsM: A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD 53-76 (1996).
60 See FOWLER & HERTZKE, supra note 50, at 7; ALAN RYAN, LIBERAL ANXIETIES AND
LIBERAL EDUCATION 74, 78-79 (1998).
61 I do think that liberal intellectuals have generally been slow to credit the role
of religion in liberal movements. Consider WolterstorfFs statement:
Many of the movements in the modem world which have resulted in reforms
and revolutions that the liberal admires have been deeply religious in their
orientation: the abolitionist movement in nineteenth-century America, the
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terest predominates over religious inclinations. 62 I would expect
though that arguments to support the status quo (although not in all
its particulars) dominate most of the time. The impulse to conform
and to go along is quite strong. Of course, the religious right stands
outside the conformist mold. Even if conservative religious argument
in the political sphere predominated over progressive religious argu-
ments, 63 I would still argue that religious argument has a progressive
tilt. Consider the state of public argument about most issues of policy.
Apart from day-to-day scandals, political talk seems dominated by utili-
tarian and economic concerns, debates about means-ends rationality,
and discussions about the interest in letting us be alone. 64 Notions
that we might have some responsibility and concern for others are
subordinate themes in political life if they exist at all. Our right to
exploit others seems to be a common assumption in American foreign
policy debates so long as it makes us wealthier. To be sure, there is no
shortage of religious argument to support the status quo, but religious
perspectives frequently buck the egoistic tide. In my view, they are a
necessary counterpoint to the corporate state. I do not suggest that
they have been especially effective counterpoints to the corporate
state. My claim is more of the something-is-better-than-nothing
variety.
civil rights movement in twentieth-century America, the resistance move-
ments in fascist Germany, in communist Eastern Europe, and in apartheid
South Africa. These movements are regularly analyzed by Western academ-
ics and intellectuals as if religion were nowhere in the picture.
Wolterstorff, supra note 56, at 162.
As to the strength of the religious right, "only 11% of a national sample admitted
to knowing much about the movement and just 9 percent of respondents claimed to
think of themselves as members." KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND PoLrrIcs IN THE
UNITED STATES 245-46 (1997). On the other hand, the religious right has strength
beyond its numbers in the Republican party. I believe that constituency was a "but for
cause" of the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. I also believe, however,
that this action will significantly damage the Republican party.
62 Surely, this was the case in the South on the slavery issue.
63 See VERBA ET AL., supra note 50, at 521 (arguing that "the center of gravity of
the religious agenda in politics is a conservative concern with a particular focus on
advocacy of pro-life views on abortions"); see also id. at 19. But there are some indica-
tions that this conclusion may have been influenced by their methods of gathering
data. As they suggest, when activist participants indicated a concern with welfare or
housing, they did not ask whether they wanted more or less governmental involve-
ment and, therefore, could not tell whether the correlation on these issues was liberal
or conservative. On the other hand, they did ask for activists' points of view on the
abortion question. See id. at 470.
64 See Wolterstorff, supra note 56, at 177-79.
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To be sure, progressives rightly fear the religious right. But I
would argue that one does not need a religion to become intolerant,
mean, and selfish (except about other religions). It might take reli-
gion for people to steer an altruistic course. If religion is thought by
many to be a positive force in the private lives of many, the same rea-
sons have some force in suggesting that its role in public life is, on
balance, positive.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION?
Even if religion's role in public life were on balance positive, the
question arises whether religiously motivated legislation should be
considered in violation of the Establishment Clause. 65 If religiously
motivated legislation violates the Establishment Clause, then it must
be uncivil for people to recommend legislation for religious reasons.
As I suggested earlier, I believe that to use religious reasons in the
whereas clauses of legislation should count as an Establishment Clause
violation. To do so ordinarily would amount to imposing sanctions or
extracting taxation in the name of religion or otherwise formally en-
dorsing religion. But to stop short of formally employing religious
reasons or religious content in legislation or government action does
not involve a violation of the Establishment Clause. My point is not
that you may have religious motivation so long as you are not stupid
enough to make your motivation clear. My point is that you may have
religious motivation so long as you are not stupid enough to violate
the Establishment Clause by enshrining your motivation into a formal
governmental statement. To be more precise, my claim is that legisla-
tion does not violate the Establishment Clause when: (1) it has a secu-
lar purpose;66 (2) it does not otherwise violate the Establishment
Clause because of its religious content;67 (3) it does not contain a reli-
65 My colleague Gary Simson has argued that laws should be invalidated if they
"would not have been adopted if a nonsecular purpose had not been considered."
Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Ap-
proach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 910 (1987). See also Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Pur-
pose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 INDIANA L.J. 1 (1991) (asserting that
religious purpose is sometimes unconstitutional, and sometimes not).
66 I will bracket difficult questions about pretextual purposes for later writing.
67 I recognize that the determination of what counts as religious content or reli-
gious symbolism can be difficult. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know it When We
See It" The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986). I certainly would
not take the Supreme Court decisions on these issues as my normative guide. In my
view, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which held that inclusion of
a creche in a city display with secular symbols does not violate the Establishment
Clause, is an unqualified outrage. See also William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme
Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770.
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gious reason in its whereas clause;68 and even when (4) it was moti-
vated by religious considerations as a "but for" cause of its passage.
69
68 With possible exceptions I will slide past here, I believe that religious reasons
should not be an official basis for government action. State declarations of religious
reasons should be deemed to be a violation of the Establishment Clause whether they
be whereas clauses in legislation or a passage in a majority court opinion. The ques-
tion of remedy in the latter situation may be difficult, but I would contend that judges
take an oath to defend the Constitution and take an oath not to rely on religious
reasons in opinions of the court. A requirement of official secular defense, however,
need not entail a requirement of secular motivation. It is, of course, arguable that
judges should not be relying on their own moral views, but should instead be inter-
preting, when relevant, the morality of the society, but I shall not enter that thicket
here. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review
Essay, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1523 (1989).
Whether legislators should be able to express religious motivation may depend
upon the context. Clearly, if there is a tangible risk that their expression will be seen
as evidencing religious purpose for the legislation with secular purpose as a pretext,
they should not express religious motivation. In the absence of such a risk (imagine
the expression of religious motivation for a murder statute), they should feel free to
do so. Of course, most will not do so except in the most general way because of the
relative political risks and benefits. Apart from the political tilt of religion, most liber-
als would welcome the cultivation of moral behavior and of civic virtue that religion
and religious associations tend to promote. As Rawls perceives it, a well-ordered soci-
ety, among other things, is one in which "everyone accepts, and knows that everyone
else accepts, the very same principles of'justice .... " RAWLS, Pot~cAI LIBERALISM,
supra note 2, at 35.
69 For example, a statute mandating a moment of silence in public schools at the
outset of the day might be defended on secular grounds, but such a statute ordinarily
would not be passed without religious instigation and support. Under the perspective
which I follow, such a statute would be constitutional. See Bown v. Gwinnett County
Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997). On the other hand, the statute in Wallace
v. Jafifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), where a moment of silence statute requiring one minute
for meditation at the outset of the day was amended to provide for meditation or
voluntary prayer, was properly declared unconstitutional, in my view. I will not, how-
ever, dwell upon the extent to which my views track those held by the Supreme Court.
Compare Simson, supra note 65, at 909 ("[I]t seems clear that, unless a law is proven to
be predicated entirely or almost entirely on nonsecular purposes," no establishment
clause objection based on purpose will prevail.), and Laycock, supra note 44, at 811
("[The] legislature [must] have some actual secular purpose; it may also have reli-
gious purposes, and the religious purposes might even be dominant, so long as there
is some secular purpose."), with Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public
Square, 105 HAzy. L. REv. 2061, 2071 (1992) (book review) ("In light of existing
Supreme Court precedent, it is doubtful that a law motivated in fact by religious con-
siderations could withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny simply because it arguably
furthers an articulable secular public purpose."). Some of the relevant cases include
Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating law forbidding the teaching of
evolution in public school without also teaching "creation science"); Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 38 (invalidating law authorizing a period of silence in public schools specifically for
meditation and voluntary prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating
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Because I do not want to unduly lengthen this Article, my goal is to
give some indication as to how this claim might be supported rather
than to offer an extended brief for it. Many have argued for different
perspectives on the Establishment Clause; I propose merely to assert a
partial perspective here and seek to apply it.
The Establishment Clause is supported by multiple reasons: it is a
prophylactic measure that protects religious liberty;70 it stands for
equal citizenship without regard to religion; 71 it protects churches
from the corrupting influences of the state;72 it protects the autonomy
of the state;73 it protects taxpayers from being forced to support reli-
gious ideologies to which they are opposed;74 it promotes religion in
the private sphere;75 and it also protects against the destabilizing influ-
ence of having the polity divided along religious lines.76 If, for exam-
required posting of Ten Commandments on public school walls); Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in pub-
lic schools).
70 This aspect of the Establishment Clause is emphasized in JESSE H. CHOPER,
SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1995) and Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost
Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1985-1986).
71 This follows from the position articulated by Justice O'Connor that any en-
dorsement of religion is invalid because it "sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political commu-
nity." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Blackmun, O'Connor, & Stevens,
JJJ.); see also William W. Van Alstyne, Wat is "an Establishment of Religion"?, 65 N.C. L.
REv. 909, 914 (1987); cf Christopher L. Eisbgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnera-
bility of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1245 (1994) (applying an equality analysis to free exercise issues).
72 This was the special concern of Roger Williams. See IssAc KRAMNicK & R. LAU-
RENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CoRREar-
NESS 46-66 (1996); EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE
STATE (1967); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 1181-82 (1988); Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at
914-15.
73 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
74 See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1994); Douglas Laycock, The
Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL. L. Rev. 373, 373-74 (1992).
75 This has been an effect of the clause, see FOWLER & HERTZKE, supra note 50, at
10-11, but I doubt the workings of this aspect were foreseen even though there is
substantial reason to believe the framers would have welcomed it. See also JOHN H.
GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996) (asserting that religious freedom is pro-
tected because religion is a good thing); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153-66 (1991).
76 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24 (1970); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect
Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 360
(1996); Sullivan, supra note 21.
1654 [VCOL. 74:5
1999] RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY 1655
ple, the Lutheran Church were established in Minnesota,
77
discrimination against non-Lutherans would be encouraged and non-
Lutherans would rightly regard themselves as second class citizens;78
the Church might be pressured to support state initiatives of which it
would otherwise steer clear. The state might be pressured to adopt
measures about which it would otherwise remain neutral, and non-
Lutheran taxpayers would be forced to support a church to which
they were ideologically opposed. The incentives to form non-Lu-
theran religions would be diminished, and a destructive fight to oust
the Lutheran Church would be ongoing with recriminations on all
sides.
Religiously motivated legislation touches on many of these con-
cerns, but in far less substantial ways. I ask my classes if, apart from
other constitutional considerations, a law criminalizing abortion
should be invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds if a crucial
part of its passage has been religious support. My classes overwhelm-
ingly say "yes." They quickly reconsider, however, when I ask them this
question: Assume that a crucial cause of the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was the support of religious groups making religious argu-
ments.79 Should the 1964 Civil Rights Act be struck down on estab-
lishment grounds? Suppose the same for religious abolitionists and
the abolition of slavery.80
A religiously motivated civil rights act or a religiously motivated
anti-abortion statute8l implicates some, but not all, of the Establish-
77 Of the seven states establishing religion at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, none of them established a single church. They all, in one way or another,
provided for multiple establishments. See LEONARD W. LEVY, TBE ESTABuSHMrN
CLAUSE xxii (1993).
78 One might think the non-Mormons in Utah already think of themselves as
second class citizens because of the dominant place of the Mormon Church in the
culture of Utah. In a sense, however, such an observation would miss the central
point of this section. It is one thing to live in a culture in which one perceives oneself
as an outsider (as do non-Mormons in Utah orJews in the United States at large). It
would be quite another for Utah to formally proclaim the Mormon Church as the
established church or for the United States to formally declare itself to be a Christian
nation. Second class citizenship would then be official government policy.
79 The assumption is not unreasonable. Both opponents and supporters of the
legislation agreed that the churches' involvement was crucial to its passage. See A.
JAMES RE OLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 248 (1985).
80 Suppose it turned out that most provisions of a state's quite ordinary penal
code were thought by citizens to be primarily justified for religious reasons. Would
such a code violate the Establishment Clause?
81 I would invalidate such a statute on due process or equal protection grounds,
but not on religion clause grounds.
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ment Clause concerns.8 2 Neither seems to imperil the free exercise of
religion nor interfere with the function of the Establishment Clause in
promoting private religions. They do not threaten churches with the
corrupting influence of the state, nor do they force taxpayers to sup-
port religious ideologies to which they are opposed. (They are moti-
vated by ideology, but they are not ideology.) To be sure, they risk the
destabilizing influence of having the polity divided along religious
lines, but as I suggested earlier, one person's destabilizing influence is
another person's freedom of speech. More serious is the argument
that the passage of such laws will leave some with the impression that
they are outsiders-that they are not equal citizens. 83 To put it an-
other way, the presence of religion in the debate has an impact on the
social meaning of the legislation. 84 I regard this as a serious point, but
I think it is sufficiently mitigated by the requirements of a secular pur-
pose and by the absence of direct religious content. Finally, one
might ask whether such laws interfere with the autonomy of the state
to protect the public interest. This merely restates the question to be
decided. In what sense should the state be autonomous? Clearly, in a
pluralistic society, the state should certainly be free from the influence
of an established church for all of the reasons mentioned. But, in a
pluralistic society, it is precisely my point that churches and believers
should be able to weigh in on controversial public questions. To
counsel against their input is to betray the principles of liberalism, not
to support them.
82 My colleague Gary Simson suggests the appropriate focus is the cumulative
effect of such statutes rather the effects in specific instances. The same kind of argu-
ment was put forth to authorize the regulation of commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). I think the force of Professor Simson's concern, however, is dulled
by the fact that I am discussing government actions without religious content and by
the pluralistic character of religions in American society.
83 At the same time we should not fool ourselves, for this culture regularly re-
minds non-Christians that they are not equal citizens. See, e.g., STEPiHEN FEL.DMAN,
PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY CHRIsTMAs: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE (1997).
84 See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religious Clauses, 102 YAa LJ.
1611, 1628. (1993).
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